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Non-Technical-Summary 
 
Global warming, the pollution of the seas or a continuously increasing noise level are just a few examples of 
environmental issues that have alerted the global public in recent years. As a consequence, more and more 
scientific bodies and environmental groups are discussing whether the emission of pollution as a by-product of 
modern economic activity may endanger the exceptional economic growth path, the world has experienced 
during the last one and a half centuries. 
 To shed further light on this question, a standard Schumpeterian growth model is enlarged to include an 
environmental dimension. Thereby it explicitly links the pollution intensity of economic activity to the overall 
level of technological progress. More precisely, it is assumed that pollution arises as an externality of the 
intermediate good production process and the amount of pollution created in the production process crucially 
depends on the overall level of technological progress. Within the framework of the model, pollution has 
different effects on the agents present in the economy. In the basic model solely the households are directly 
affected by pollution. In a first extension, the model is enlarged to feature a pollution threshold above which no 
research is possible. A second extension enlarges the choice set of the households and allows for private 
pollution abatement. 
 In equilibrium, the economy follows a balanced growth path where output, research investment, 
consumption, as well as the level of technological progress grow at a constant and positive rate. The effect of 
pollution on the economic growth rate vitally depends on the households' degree of pollution aversion and even 
more on the link between pollution intensity and the technology level. All in all, pollution dampens the economic 
growth rate if a rise in the level of technological progress does not imply a big enough decrease of the pollution 
intensity. It fosters growth if the pollution intensity falls disproportionately fast when the economy advances. 
Pollution growth is proportional to the growth rate of the economy and also crucially depends on how the 
pollution intensity of the production process is linked to the level of technological progress. If the pollution 
intensity declines fast enough when the level of technological progress increases over time, pollution declines. 
Otherwise pollution grows continuously or is constant. Due to four types of deviations, namely monopolistic 
pricing, the appropriability effect, the business stealing effect and pollution externalities, the decentralized 
solution does not meet the social optimum. But, the social optimum can be implemented through the introduction 
of a subsidy to the final good sector, a subsidy towards the research sector and tradable pollution permits. 
 Given a pollution threshold above which no research is feasible, sustained economic growth is only 
possible if pollution does not increase over time. This implies that the pollution intensity must be decoupled 
from technological progress. Otherwise, at some point in time pollution will stall growth in the economy. The 
possibility of private pollution abatement enables the households to cope better with the pollution emitted during 
the production process and allows the economy to grow at a higher rate. 
Nicht-Technische Zusammenfassung 
 
Der Klimawandel, die Verschmutzung der Meere oder eine zunehmende Lärmbelastung sind nur einige wenige 
Beispiele für Umweltprobleme, die die Öffentlichkeit in jüngster Zeit alarmiert haben. Infolge dessen gewinnt 
die Frage, ob Umweltverschmutzung als eine Begleiterscheinung der modernen wirtschaftlichen Aktivität 
möglicherweise den außergewöhnlichen Wachstumspfad der letzten eineinhalb Jahrhunderte gefährdet, 
zunehmend an Bedeutung. 
 Um dieser Frage auf den Grund zu gehen wird ein schumpeterisches Wachstumsmodell erweitert und 
Umweltverschmutzung in das Kalkül der ökonomischen Agenten integriert. Dabei wird die 
Verschmutzungsintensität der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität explizit mit dem Niveau des technischen Fortschritts 
verknüpft. Im Rahmen des Modells hat Umweltverschmutzung verschiedene Auswirkungen auf die Agenten. Im 
Basismodell sind zunächst nur die privaten Haushalte von der Verschmutzung betroffen. In einer ersten 
Erweiterung wird das Modell um einen Verschmutzungsgrenzwert ergänzt, jenseits dessen die 
Innovationsfähigkeit des Forschungssektors abnimmt. Eine weitere Variante vergrößert die Handlungs-
möglichkeiten der Haushalte und gibt ihnen die Möglichkeit zur aktiven Verschmutzungsminderung. 
 In dem beschriebenen Modellrahmen bewegt sich die Ökonomie im Gleichgewicht auf einem Balanced 
Growth Path. Dementsprechend steigen die Mengen an produzierten Gütern, die Investitionen in Forschung, der 
private Konsum und das Niveau des technischen Fortschritts im Gleichgewicht mit einer konstanten und 
positiven Rate. Der Effekt von Umweltverschmutzung auf das Wirtschaftswachstum ist nicht trivial. Er wird 
maßgeblich von dem Grad der Verschmutzungsaversion der Haushalte sowie der Art und Weise wie die 
Verschmutzungsintensität mit dem technischen Fortschritt verknüpft ist beeinflusst. Alles in allem wirkt 
Umweltverschmutzung dämpfend auf das Wirtschaftswachstum, sofern ein Anstieg des technologischen 
Fortschritts nicht mit einer ausreichend schnellen Absenkung der Verschmutzungsintensität einhergeht. 
Verschmutzung begünstigt Wachstum, wenn die Verschmutzungsintensität bei steigendem technischem Wissen 
überproportional schnell fällt. Das Ausmaß der Umweltverschmutzung wächst proportional zum 
Wirtschaftswachstum und wird auch maßgeblich davon beeinflusst, wie die Verschmutzungsintensität mit dem 
technischen Fortschritt verknüpft ist. Wenn diese schnell genug fällt, sinkt die Menge an Umweltverschmutzung. 
Andernfalls bleibt sie konstant oder steigt kontinuierlich an. Aufgrund von monopolistischer Preissetzung, dem 
Appropriations-Effekt, dem Business-Stealing-Effekt und der Verschmutzungsexternalität ist die dezentrale 
Lösung des Modells nicht Pareto-optimal. Das soziale Optimum kann jedoch durch die Einführung von 
Subventionen für den Forschungssektor und den Endproduktsektor sowie durch handelbare Emissionszertifikate 
erreicht werden. 
 Wird das Modell um einen Verschmutzungsgrenzwert erweitert, bei dessen erreichen die 
Innovationsfähigkeit des Forschungssektors nachlässt, ist anhaltendes Wirtschaftswachstum nur möglich, wenn 
die Menge der Umweltverschmutzung nicht im Zeitverlauf steigt. Dies setzt voraus, dass die 
Verschmutzungsintensität vom technischen Fortschritt entkoppelt ist. Ist dies nicht der Fall, so verhindert 
Umweltverschmutzung, ab dem Erreichen des Grenzwertes, weiteres Wirtschaftswachstum. Aktive 
Verschmutzungsbeseitigung wiederum erlaubt es den Haushalten besser mit der Umweltverschmutzung aus der 
Produktion umzugehen und ermöglicht allgemein größere Wachstumsraten. 
Pollution Externalities in a
Schumpeterian Growth Model
Simon Koesler∗
August 2010
Abstract
This paper extends a standard Schumpeterian growth model to include an envi-
ronmental dimension. Thereby, it explicitly links the pollution intensity of economic
activity to technological progress. In a second step, it investigates the effect of pollu-
tion on economic growth under the assumption that pollution intensities are related
to technological progress. Several conclusions emerge from the model. In equilib-
rium, the economy follows a balanced growth path. The effect of pollution on the
economic growth rate vitally depends on the households’ degree of pollution aversion
and on the link between pollution intensity and the technology level. The decen-
tralized solution does not meet the social optimum, though the social optimum can
be implemented through the introduction of subsidies and pollution permits. Ex-
pectedly, the introduction of a pollution threshold stalls growth if pollution is not
decoupled from economic growth and the possibility of pollution abatement allows
the economy to grow at a higher rate.
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1 Introduction
Global warming, the pollution of the seas or a continuously increasing noise level are just a
few examples of environmental issues that have alerted the global public in recent years. As a
consequence, more and more scientific bodies and environmental groups are discussing whether the
emission of pollution as a by-product of modern economic activity may endanger the exceptional
economic growth, the world has experienced during the last one and a half centuries.
To shed further light on this question, this paper extends a standard Schumpeterian growth
model to include an environmental dimension. Thereby it explicitly links the pollution intensity of
economic activity to the overall level of technological progress. More precisely, it is assumed that
pollution arises as an externality of the intermediate good production process and the amount of
pollution created in the production process crucially depends on the overall level of technological
progress. The necessity of such a feature arises from the fact that today the pollution intensity is
seen as a key factor in solving the problem of environmental degradation. Furthermore, pollution
has an effect on the agents present in the economy. At first, solely the households are directly
affected by pollution, though they take pollution as given. Later, the model is enlarged to feature
a pollution threshold above which no research is possible and private pollution abatement is
allowed.
In a second step, using the extended Schumpeterian growth model, this work investigates the
effect of pollution on economic growth. In particular it seeks to resolve the following questions:
• How are the levels, the paths or the growth rates of crucial variables such as consumption,
investment or pollution affected?
• What types of deviations can be observed when comparing the decentralized solution with
the social optimum and what are the policy implications for these deviations?
• Is it possible to have sustained growth if there exists a pollution threshold?
• Is environmental protection in the form of pollution abatement compatible with economic
growth?
This work is organized as follows. After the introduction, section 2 presents the basic model
and briefly discusses the main aspects that have to be considered when incorporating pollution in
modern economic growth models. Section 3 derives and characterizes the balanced growth path of
the decentralized economy and explores the implications of pollution for the growth rate. Section
4 analyses the Pareto optimality of the decentralized economy and demonstrates how the optimal
path can be implemented. Section 5 enlarges the basic model and discusses the implications of a
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pollution threshold as well as the effects of pollution abatement. This work ends with a summary
of the results and concluding remarks in section 6. The appendix contains detailed derivations.
2 Description of the Model
2.1 Model Outline
The model is an advanced version of Aghion and Howitt’s (1992) well-known Schumpetarian
Model of Endogenous Growth and is set such that an equilibrium can be derived in a similar
manner as Barro and Sala i Martin’s (2004) interpretation of Aghion and Howitt’s model.
As usual, there are two sectors, a final good sector and a combined R&D and intermediate
production sector, as well as many identical households. Additionally, the standard model has
been extended to include an environmental dimension. The model is set in infinite and continuous
time and all agents are assumed to have perfect foresight.
2.2 Households
In the economy, there is a large but finite and constant number of L identical and infinitely living
households. Every household consists of one adult who provides one unit of labor to the final
good sector and holds assets in the form of a balanced portfolio of all firms in the economy. They
earn wages, receive interest income on their assets and consume the final good. Furthermore, all
households are affected by the public bad pollution, yet they take pollution as exogenously given.
Their momentary utility is given by
u(t) =
 11−θ
(
(c(t)P (t)η)(1−θ) − 1
)
for 0 < θ <∞ and θ 6= 1
ln c(t) + η lnP (t) for θ = 1.
(1)
c(t) is consumption per household of the final good at time t,1 P (t) the total amount of pollution
present in the economy at time t, θ the multiplicative inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution and −∞ < η < 0 a parameter determining the degree of pollution aversion of the
households. The utility function ensures that the utility depends positively on the number of final
goods consumed (uc > 0) and negatively on the level of pollution they are exposed to (uP < 0).
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1C(t) is the total consumption at time t and since there are L households in the economy c(t) = C(t)L
is the consumption per household.
2Here and throughout the text uc =
∂u(t)
∂c(t) , uP =
∂u(t)
∂P (t) , ucc =
∂( ∂u(t)∂c(t) )
∂c(t) and ucP =
∂( ∂u(t)∂c(t) )
∂P (t) . Note also
that whenever no ambiguity results, the time subscript of variables is omitted.
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In this setting, it is assumed that every single household is affected by the total amount of
pollution prevailing in the economy, yet it would also be possible to assume that the households
are only affected by their particular pollution share, which is PL . However, since L is constant
over time, an alternative utility function using PL instead of P would not yield any additional
insights.
2.3 Final Good Sector
The final good sector is competitive, and every firm i produces the final good Y according to the
following Cobb-Douglas production function
Yi = BL
1−α
i
N∑
j=1
(qκjXij)
α , (2)
where 0 < α < 1, Yi is the final output firm i produces, B > 0 is an overall measure of productivity
in the final sector, Li is the amount of labor hired by firm i and Xij is the quantity of intermediate
good j that firm i uses. N represents the number of varieties of intermediates available in the
economy, whereas it is assumed that N is constant over time and very large. Finally, 1 ≤ q <∞
represents a constant quality parameter and κj the quality rank of intermediate j. The final
good production as a whole experiences diminishing returns, even tough the productivity of each
intermediate good increases with its quality level.
In this model, the final good Y is a numeraire, so its price is equal to one, and it can be used
for consumption, as an input in the intermediate sector or as investment in the R&D sector.
2.4 Technological Progress
Before describing the functioning of the combined R&D and intermediate sector in detail, it is
important to explain what is meant by the term technological progress in this economy. In this
context, technological progress consists of improvements regarding the quality of a certain type
of intermediate good. Each innovation increases the quality rank κj of a intermediate good j
by one and since innovations are irrevocable, as time passes, the intermediates climb a so-called
quality ladder.
Quality improvements of a specific intermediate occur independently of the quality levels of
other intermediate goods. While it is possible to have a big variety of quality ranks, it would also
be thinkable to have a uniform quality level. In order to assess the overall level of technological
progress in the economy,
Q(κj) =
N∑
j=1
q
κjα
(1−α) (3)
3
is defined as the aggregated quality level prevailing in the economy.
2.5 Combined R&D and Intermediate Sector
The intermediate good sector and the research sector are unified and henceforth will be called
the RDI sector.3 As soon as a research firm is successful and innovates, it obtains a patent on its
innovation and from then on is the sole producer of the most advanced intermediate good. Thus,
after production, the intermediate good Xj is sold at a monopolistic price to the final good sector.
What is more, innovations are always drastic. This means that the more advanced good replaces
the older good completely until the next innovation for the same intermediate takes place and it
is also replaced. This feature puts Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction into effect, as old
vintages of a good are supplanted, or in the terms of Schumpeter, destroyed by goods of a higher
quality (Schumpeter, 1912).
Intermediate goods are produced from the firms holding the corresponding patent for good j
according to the simple production function
Xj = yj , (4)
where yj is the number of final goods used to produce intermediateXj . Accordingly, one final good
Y is used to produce one intermediate good Xj . From this it follows that the total investment of
final good Y towards the intermediate good production is
N∑
j=1
yj =
N∑
j=1
Xj = X. (5)
Innovations occur with a probability of
l(κj) = Z(κj)φ(κj), (6)
where Z(κj) is the amount of R&D investment of a firm for intermediate j subject to its quality
rank κj and φ(κj) a term capturing the effect of the current quality rank on research. φ(κj) is
assumed to be
φ(κj) = Aq
−(κj+1) α(1−α) , (7)
3Note, the combined R&D and intermediate sector could also be modeled as two separate sectors
without changing the results of the model. In this case, the firms in the intermediate sector would have
to acquire a license for the blueprints of the highest quality intermediate from the R&D firms before they
can produce the intermediate good at a quantity they desire and sell it to the final good sector (Romer,
1990).
4
where A > 0 represents an exogenous parameter measuring the productivity of the research
sector. Hence, innovations become more difficult the more sophisticated the intermediate is; a
feature that can be interpreted as some sort of “fishing-out”.
There is free entry into the innovator business, and despite the patents, all inventors have
access to the blueprints of the most advanced intermediate good. They are simply by law not
allowed to produce it.
Although there are no assumptions regarding who innovates, Arrow’s replacement effect,
which states that an incumbent monopolist has always lower incentives to innovate than a poten-
tial entrant who can take over the monopolists rents once he successfully innovates, ensures that
only outsiders or newcomers undertake research. The underlying logic of this is that, in contrast
to an entrant, the incumbent monopolist already earns positive profits from the innovation he has
generated earlier and by the means of another innovation he would only replace his own monopoly.
Consequently, his benefit from another innovation is always strictly lower than the benefit of a
newcomer. Moreover, the free entry condition requires all researching firms to be indifferent in
undertaking research, no matter if they are incumbents or entrants. But if the outsiders with
their higher research incentives fulfill the free entry condition, the incumbents always make a loss
when engaging in the innovation business. Thus no research investment is the best choice for the
incumbents and all innovations are generated by newcomers (Arrow, 1962).
2.6 Pollution
In general, the integration of pollution in an economic growth model requires the consideration
of three aspects: the nature of pollution, the source of pollution and the effects of pollution on
the agents in the economy.
The Nature of Pollution When specifying pollution in an economic growth model, there
are two ways of interpreting pollution. Pollution can either be seen as a flow variable, which
exclusively depends on the amount of pollution generated in the present period, or as a stock
variable, so that the amount of pollution prevailing in an economy is determined by an evolution
equation relating the present amount of pollution to past pollution (Stokey, 1998).
Commonly, the modeling of pollution in one or the other way is justified by the assumed
composition of pollution, as done for instance by Stokey (1998). On the one hand, according to
her, pollution may be associated with fugitive substances such as noise, smoke or electric smog.
In this case pollution would be modeled as a flow variable. On the other hand, pollution can
be seen as a stock of accumulated pollutants, as for example waste or greenhouse gases. If so,
pollution is rather considered to be a stock variable.
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Though, besides from the composition of pollutants, there are also other popular arguments
for modeling pollution as a flow variable or as a stock variable. While the potential to generate
transitional dynamics and the possibility to account for regenerative processes of the environment
speak for pollution as a stock variable (Xepapadeas, 2005), the fact that avoiding another state
variable mostly simplifies the computation of the equilibrium argues in favor of pollution as a
flow variable (Elbasha and Roe, 1996).
Both approaches, pollution as a flow or as a stock variable, are frequently used throughout
the literature on environmental growth models. For instance, Gradus and Smulders (1993) as
well as Hart (2004) analyze the effect of pollution on growth using a flow variable, while Boven-
berg and Smulders (1995) as well as Popp (2004) consider the consequences of a stock variable.
Smulders and Gradus (1996) and Stokey (1998) have also worked on a comparison, contrasting
the consequences of a flow variable with those of a stock variable. They conclude that in models
with exogenous technological change and in the context of AK models, there is no substantial
difference in the results when using a stock or a flow variable for pollution. However, a proof
that this result does also apply in a Schumpeterian growth framework is still subject to current
research.
The model presented in this work uses a flow variable for pollution in order avoid the intricacies
of a new state variable. Hence, pollution is presumed to be a fugitive substance and no pollution
is transfered from one period to the next.
The Source of Pollution According to Xepapadeas (2005), there are three main approaches
of how pollution can be generated in an economic model.
In a first attempt pollution can be linked to the level of private consumption. In such a
setting, pollution can be seen as a byproduct of consumption and the households are responsible
for determining how much pollution is generated in the economy.
Alternatively, pollution may arise because it is needed as an input in the production process
for the goods traded in the economy. Here, the firms decide directly how much pollution will be
present in the economy when choosing which inputs they will use and what amount of output
they will produce.
Yet typically, the flow of pollution is being related to an externality of the production process,
so that pollution is a necessary byproduct of production. In this context, once more the firms
decide how much pollution is created. Although, in such a setting, they do it rather indirectly
by choosing an appropriate level of output.
One of the first to implement the externality approach was Forster (1973) and it gained
widespread acceptance when it was used by Gradus and Smulders (1993) in their seminal con-
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tribution to the environmental growth theory. Stokey (1998) and Aghion and Howitt (1998)
extended the traditional pollution output relation by explicitly introducing a parameter measur-
ing the pollution intensity of output, even though this parameter remained exogenous, until for
instance the work of Grimaud (1999) or Hart (2004) who finally endogenize the pollution intensity
of the production process.
The model in this section is constructed in tradition to these models. It is assumed, that the
pollution P (t) arises as an externality of the production process of the intermediate goods X(t).
Furthermore, the pollution intensity of a good evolves in line with the general quality rank of a
good. Correspondingly, the pollution P (t) is assumed to be
P (t) =
 N∑
j=1
q
κj(t)α
1−α
−ζ N∑
j=1
Xj(t) = Q
−ζ(t)
N∑
j=1
Xj(t), (8)
where −∞ < ζ < ∞ is a finite and constant parameter determining the effect the level of tech-
nological progress Q(t) has on pollution P (t). Thus, the pollution intensity of the intermediate
sector depends directly on the aggregated quality level and the parameter ζ is crucial regard-
ing the magnitude of produced pollution. Consequently, if ζ is high (low), the production of
intermediate goods entails a low (high) pollution generation. The fundamental idea behind this
form of pollution function is that innovations are rarely bound to a single property, here output
productivity or pollution intensity, and that progress in one specific area can have a broad effect
on the economy as a whole.
Effects of Pollution The introduction of pollution into an economic model would be of no
interest if pollution would not have an effect on the agents or markets in the economy. Generally
speaking, one could think of a multitude of possibilities of how pollution might take effect in an
economic growth model and consequently the following will have to focus on those approaches
that have been discussed most in economic literature.
One possible way of introducing an effect of pollution, is to make the households dependent on
the amount of pollution present in the economy. The simplest way of doing this is to incorporate
pollution directly in the utility function of households, so that u(c, P ) with uP < 0, as by definition
pollution causes disutility. This approach is used in the majority of environmental growth models
since it is highly intuitive and standard economic growth models can easily be adapted to feature
such an extended utility function. A different method of rendering households dependent on
pollution, is to postulate that the amount of labor they supply is vulnerable to pollution. The
idea behind this is that an increasing amount of pollution harms the workers and therefore only
a certain amount of effective labor can be employed in the production process. However, even
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though this approach has been elaborated empirically, so far little attention has been dedicated
to this sort of pollution effect in the context of environmental growth models. For an exception
see the work of Gradus and Smulders (1993).
An alternative approach of generating an effect of pollution consists in allowing pollution
to have an influence on firms. One way of doing this is to specify the model that firms need
pollution as an input for the production process. The consequence would be that firms may be
forced to alter their production and innovation decisions if pollution is bound to stay below a
certain threshold. Among scholars this approach has also proven to be very popular and it can
be found in several seminal papers on environmental growth models ranging from Bovenberg and
Smulders (1995) to Ricci (2007). Another method is to make the productivity of firms subject
to the amount of pollution present in the economy. One can argue that pollution can affect the
quality of the inputs used in the production of goods and therefore pollution will once more alter
the production and innovation decisions of firms. On closer examination, this approach is similar
to the one considering a decrease of the workforce due to pollution and in the end will have akin
implications.
As mentioned above, there are numerous ways of introducing a pollution effect into growth
models and this list could be continued with approaches allowing pollution to affect the reelection
probability of policy makers or the market structure in the economy. Though this would go beyond
the scope of this work.
The subsequent analysis assumes at first that pollution affects the economy through the
utility of the households. In compliance with equation (1) households experience disutility from
pollution. Later, the model is enlarged, and it is presumed that the RDI sector is vulnerable to
pollution.
3 Equilibrium
After having presented the model in the previous section, the balanced growth path can now
be derived in order to analyze the behavior of the model over time. In this context, a balanced
growth path is defined as a state in which the variables of the model, namely Y (t), X(t), C(t),
Z(t), Q(t) and P (t), grow at constant rates.
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3.1 Decentralized Solution
Households’ Problem Solving the households’ problem and recalling that the population L
is constant, leads to the extended Ramsey Rule4
r = ρ+ θ
c˙
c
− η (1− θ) P˙
P
= ρ+ θ
C˙
C
− η (1− θ) P˙
P
, (9)
where 0 < ρ < ∞ represents the rate of time preference and r(t) the interest rate at time t. Its
interpretation is almost standard. To forgo consumption in the current period the households
require the marginal rate of return to equal the rate of time preference plus a premium since the
faster consumption is expanded, the faster the marginal utility of consumption decreases and the
less future returns on savings are appreciated. But here, the households additionally need to be
compensated for the change in marginal utility that comes along with a change of pollution and
interestingly, even though consumers take pollution as given, its evolution nevertheless affects
their behavior. For the sake of completeness, the solution of the household problem determines
a global optimum and is unique.
Output Decision of the Final Good Sector By maximizing the profits of the final good
sector for all points in time and by acknowledging that there are no dynamic constraints,
Xj = L
(
αBqακj
pj
) 1
1−α
(10)
can be derived as the aggregated demand function of the intermediate good Xj at any point in
time, whereas pj is the price of Xj .
Production and Innovation Decision of the RDI Sector There are two decisions the
firms in the RDI have to cope with. First, they have to decide whether they should perform
research and then, under the premise that they have been successfully innovating, they have
to determine the optimal price at which they sell their patented good to the final sector. This
sequential decision process can be solved through backward induction. Therefore, in a first step,
the optimal price of the intermediate Xj is determined, and in a second step, the innovation
decision is resolved.
Step 1: Pricing The optimization of the monopolistic profits a firm in the RDI sector
can earn if it has been successfully innovating, leads to the price pj that is charged for the
4The complete derivation of the solution of the household problem can be seen in section A.1 in the
appendix.
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intermediated good Xj and in combination with equation (10) to the corresponding demand for
Xj
pj =
1
α
= p, (11)
Xj = α
2
1−αLB
1
1−α q
ακj
1−α . (12)
So pj is constant over time, intermediate good and quality level. Accordingly, the monopoly
profit of a RDI firm piRDI is
piRDI(κj) =
(
1
α
− 1
)
α
2
1−αLB
1
1−α q
ακj
1−α (13)
= p¯iq
ακj
1−α , (14)
where p¯i is constant and can be seen as some sort of basic profit.
Step 2: Innovation Decision Firms in the RDI sector are only willing to undertake
research if their expected return covers at least their research investment Z(κj). Accordingly,
given that there is free entry into the research business, the expected profit of every future
innovation has to be zero, so
l(κj)E [V (κj + 1)]− Z(κj) = 0. (15)
Here V (κj) is the present value of the κjth innovation and thus
E [V (κj + 1)] is the expected value of the next technological breakthrough. Note, in equation
(15) Z(κj) > 0 must be fulfilled, since firms who want to secure profits have to devote resources
towards research.
When assuming that the interest rate is constant over time, as will be true in equilibrium,
and by using equation (6) as well as (7), l(κj) and Z(κj) can be determined to be
l(κj + 1) = p¯iA− r = l (16)
Z(κj) = q
(κj+1)
α
1−α
(
p¯i − r
A
)
. (17)
Therefore, the innovation probability l is constant over time, intermediate good and quality rank
as long as r is constant. Interestingly, due to the definition of φ(κj), the amount of research invest-
ment given by equation (17) varies across quality ranks, even though the innovation probability
l remains constant regardless of κj .
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The Balanced Growth Path From the analysis above, the values of the variables Y (t),
X(t), Z(t), C(t) and P (t) at the balanced growth path can be identified as variables depending
on the aggregated quality level Q(κj) prevailing in the economy:
X = Lα
2
1−αB
1
1−αQ (18)
from aggregating equation (12) and using equation (3).
Y = Lα
2α
1−αB
1
1−αQ (19)
from using equation (12) and aggregating equation (2).
Z = q
α
1−α
(
p¯i − r
A
)
Q (20)
from aggregating equation (17) and using equation (3).
C =
(
LB
1
1−α
(
α
2α
1−α − α 21−α
)
− q α1−α
(
p¯i − r
A
))
Q (21)
from using the resource constraint of the economy Y = C +X + Z.
P = Lα
2
1−αB
1
1−αQ1−ζ (22)
from inserting equation (18) in (8). As a result, Y , X, C and Z all grow at the same rate as the
aggregated quality level Q,
Y˙
Y
=
X˙
X
=
C˙
C
=
Z˙
Z
=
Q˙
Q
, (23)
and the pollution P at the rate
P˙
P
= (1− ζ)Q˙
Q
, (24)
whereas a dot above a variable indicates the variables first derivative with respect to time. This
leaves the growth rate of the aggregated quality level Q as the sole undetermined variable of the
balanced growth path.
Recalling equation (3) and the fact that in equilibrium the innovation probability l is constant
leads to the expected aggregated quality change per unit of time given by
E [∆Q] =
N∑
j=1
l
(
q
(κj+1)
α
(1−α) − qκj α(1−α)
)
(25)
= l
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
Q. (26)
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Dividing by Q and using equation (16) results in
E
[
∆Q
Q
]
= l
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(27)
= (p¯iA− r)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(28)
=
Q˙
Q
, (29)
whereas the last equation holds if the number of intermediate goods N is large enough to treat
Q as differentiable.
In addition, when considering equation (24), the solution of the household problem (9) can
be modified such that
r − ρ = (θ − η(1− θ)(1− ζ)) Q˙
Q
. (30)
Now, combining equations (28) and (30) makes it possible to determine the interest rate
r =
ρ+ p¯iA
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
, (31)
which is constant, so the simplification during the derivation of equation (17) has been appropri-
ate. Finally, by inserting equation (31) into (28), the growth rate of the aggregate quality level
Q˙
Q can be determined as
Q˙
Q
= γ =
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
. (32)
According to equation (23) this is also the growth rate of Y , X, Z as well as C, thus γ represents
the prevailing growth rate of the economy and in compliance with equation (24), pollution P
grows with the rate (1− ζ)γ.
The balanced growth path is unique. This becomes obvious when normalizing the balanced
growth path values of the endogenous variables given in equations (18), (19), (20), (21) and (22)
with respect to Q and recalling equation (31).
3.2 Conditions on Parameters
In order to ensure the existence of the balanced growth path, the parameters determining the
growth rate of aggregated quality, the transversality condition, the interest rate and the intertem-
poral substitution elasticity have to fulfill certain conditions.
In this model economy, once an innovation has taken place it can not be revoked or in other
words, no technological knowledge can be forgotten. As a consequence, the growth rate of the
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aggregated quality level has to be positive and in equilibrium γ = Q˙Q ≥ 0 has to be ensured. In
accordance with equation (32) and the fact that
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
≥ 0, the growth rate of aggregated
quality is guaranteed to be positive, if either
(p¯iA− ρ) ≥ 0 and 1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)) ≥ 0 (33)
or if
(p¯iA− ρ) ≤ 0 and 1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)) ≤ 0. (34)
The transversality condition (A.5) in turn, is satisfied if and only if (µ(t)a(t)) decreases over
time. On the one hand, since the combined expected profits of all firms in the RDI sector grows
with Q˙Q and the fact that the final good sector is competitive, the value of the households assets
a(t), consisting of a balanced portfolio of all firms, grows at the same rate as the economy. On
the other hand, under the terms of equation (A.4), µ(t) grows at the rate (−r). Consequently,
the transversality condition holds if
r > γ. (35)
When introducing the balanced growth path values for r and γ from equations (31) and (32) in
equation (35), this leads to two cases in which the transversality condition is fulfilled. Either
ρ > p¯iA
(
1− q −α(1−α)
)
(1− θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
if 1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)) > 0
(36)
or
ρ < p¯iA
(
1− q −α(1−α)
)
(1− θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
if 1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)) < 0.
(37)
Last but not least, given equation (31) and the assumptions that all parameters in the equation
are bound to be finite, the interest rate is finite if
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)) 6= 0. (38)
In the end, combining the conditions from equations (33), (34), (36), (37) as well as (38)
results in two cases in which the balanced growth path might exist.
Case 1: (p¯iA− ρ) > 0
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)) > 0
ρ > p¯iA
(
1− q −α(1−α)
)
(1− (θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)))
Case 2: (p¯iA− ρ) < 0
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)) < 0
ρ < p¯iA
(
1− q −α(1−α)
)
(1− (θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)))
(39)
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Though, on closer inspection, Case 2 appears to involve inconsistencies. This can best be seen,
when assuming that θ = 1.
Case 2 with θ = 1: (p¯iA− ρ) < 0
q
α
(1−α) < 0
ρ < 0
(40)
Clearly, the second and third line are inconsistent with the assumptions in section 2.3 and 3.1 on
the quality parameter q as well as on the rate of time preference ρ. Consequently, Case 1 must
be satisfied in order to ensure the existence of the balanced growth path.
But Case 1 implies that γ > 0, which is only possible if the marginal utility of consump-
tion is constant or declines over time. If this would not be the case, at some point in time
uc would be indefinitely large and households would consume the complete final good produc-
tion, leaving nothing for research investment and therewith making growth impossible. Thus
ucc = −θc−θ−1P η(1−θ) ≤ 0 and ucP = η (1− θ) c−θP η(1−θ)−1 ≤ 0 have to be fulfilled on the
balanced growth path. Since θ has already been defined to be positive, ucc ≤ 0 does not require
any further assumptions. Then again, ucP ≤ 0 necessitates θ ≤ 1 and therewith demands that
the intertemporal substitution elasticity is below unity.5
Thus, all in all, the existence of the balanced growth path requires:
(p¯iA− ρ) > 0
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)) > 0
ρ > p¯iA
(
1− q −α(1−α)
)
(1− (θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ)))
θ ≤ 1.
(41)
3.3 Effects of Pollution on the Growth Rate
Before continuing the analysis of the equilibrium by investigating the transitional dynamics and
the comparative statics of the model, it is convenient to study the effects of pollution in order to
understand the implications of the pollution dimension of the model.
In this model, pollution exclusively affects the utility of households and hence the sole channel
of transmission of pollution to economic growth must be the consumption decision of the house-
holds. The presence of pollution has two effects on the households. First, according to equation
(1), an increase in pollution decreases the households’ utility. But, as the households can not
directly influence the amount of pollution they are exposed to, this direct effect of pollution is
5Stokey (1998) as well as Aghion and Howitt (1998) come to similar conclusions regarding the intertem-
poral substitution elasticity, albeit in a different class of environmental growth models.
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limited to the households and does not provoke any consequences for the rest of the economy.
What is more important, pollution also reduces the marginal utility of consumption uc since
ucP < 0, hence the households consume less in the presence of pollution. Michel and Rotillon
(1995) call this the “distaste” effect of pollution. The pollution-induced decrease of consumption
triggers a reduction of demand for the final good, which then diminishes the need of intermediates
and thus also the expected present value of firms undertaking research. This leads to a drop in
research investment and under the terms of equation (6) to less innovations, the mainspring of
economic growth in this setting. As a consequence, the aggregated quality level Q grows slower
and in compliance with equation (23) the economic growth rate γ is reduced.
Whereas the propagation of the “distaste” effect throughout the economy is rather straight-
forward, the magnitude and the direction of this effect depends decisively on the parameter ζ
and the term η(1 − θ). On the one hand, the value of ζ is crucial in determining the amount
of pollution present in the economy, metaphorically speaking, ζ determines the size of the trans-
mission channel. On the other hand, η(1 − θ) is responsible for the amount of consumption the
households are willing to give up when faced with pollution. Hence η(1 − θ) gives the power of
pollution regarding its ability to change the households’ consumption decision.
Therefore, in order to be able to assess the consequences of pollution on the economic growth
rate, the effect of pollution must be analyzed using different constellations of ζ in relation to
η(1− θ). In the following, five different scenarios will be explored, each investigating a different
specification of ζ.6 The different prevailing economic growth rates will be compared to the growth
rate which would be present if there would exist no channel of pollution transmission.
In this simple setting, the absence of a channel of transmission of pollution to economic
growth can be simulated by setting η = 0 or in words by rendering the households indifferent to
pollution. In this case the economic growth rate would be
γno pollution =
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
θ
. (42)
Scenario 1 (ζ < 0): In this constellation, due to the terms of equation (8), innovations lead
to a high pollution intensity of the intermediate goods and according to equation (24) finally to a
pollution growth P˙P which is bigger than the overall growth rate of the economy γ. Consequently,
an increase of the intermediate production due to technological progress generates an even bigger
increase of pollution. Because of the “distaste” effect, this big increase in pollution causes a
big reduction in household consumption and thereby a much lower growth rate compared to an
6Note, according to section 2.2 and 3.2, η(1− θ) has already been restricted to be negative.
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economy without a pollution effect.7
γ(ζ<0) =
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
< γno pollution (43)
Scenario 2 (ζ = 0): In this case, innovations do not influence the pollution intensity of the
intermediate production and pollution grows at the same rate as the economy. Accordingly, more
intermediates, as a result of ongoing innovations, cause a normal sized increase in pollution, which
in turn induces a normal sized decrease in consumption. This leads to a normal sized decrease
in research investment and thus to a lower growth rate compared to the growth rate without a
pollution channel.
γ(ζ=0) =
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ))
< γno pollution (44)
Scenario 3 (0 < ζ < 1): Now the aggregated quality level has a downsizing effect on the
pollution intensity of the intermediate production, but the magnitude of this effect is rather small
and pollution grows only slightly slower than the overall economy. Hence technological progress
increases the amount of intermediates and also pollution, but the latter to a smaller extent. This
triggers only a small decrease of consumption followed by a small fall in research investment and
finally to a growth rate slightly smaller than the growth rate of an economy with no channel of
pollution transmission.
γ(0<ζ<1) =
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
< γno pollution (45)
Scenario 4 (ζ = 1): In this scenario, technological progress reduces the pollution intensity. In
fact, it depletes the pollution intensity in such a way, that increases in the intermediate production
due to innovations are completely compensated by a decrease in pollution intensity and do not
lead to more pollution. Pollution is therefore constant over time and can not negatively affect
the marginal utility of consumption. Hence, there is no “distaste” effect and there exists no
transmission channel through which pollution can affect growth.
γ(ζ=1) =
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
θ
= γno pollution (46)
7In this section, the size of the pollution increase in the different cases are compared to the case where
ζ = 0, that is, a normal sized increase of pollution results directly and solely from the increase of the
intermediate production.
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Scenario 5 (ζ > 1): In this constellation, innovations also diminish the pollution intensity.
But now, the fall in pollution intensity overcompensates the rise in intermediate production
caused by progress and pollution recedes overtime. This triggers a reverse “distaste” effect,
as the decrease in pollution causes the marginal utility of consumption to grow. Accordingly,
households tend to consume more and therefore create more research incentives in form of higher
monopolistic profits. In the end, this leads to more research and thus to bigger growth compared
to the setting where households would not be affected from pollution.
γ(ζ>1) =
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
> γno pollution (47)
To summarize, the effect of pollution on the growth rate depends on the one hand on the
households’ degree of pollution aversion η and on the other hand, and even more importantly, on
the link between pollution intensity and the overall level of technological progress, in this model
mainly determined by ζ. Pollution reduces the overall economic growth rate if a rise in the level of
technological progress does not imply a big enough decrease of the pollution intensity (ζ < 1) and
boosts growth if the pollution intensity falls disproportionately fast when the economy advances
(ζ ≥ 1). In detail:
γ(ζ<0) < γ(ζ=0) < γ(0<ζ<1) < γ(ζ=1) = γno pollution < γ(ζ>1). (48)
3.4 Transitional Dynamics and Comparative Statics
3.4.1 Transitional Dynamics
From equation (23) it is straightforward to see that at any point in time, in equilibrium, Q, Y ,
X, Z and C all grow at the same rate γ. Consequently, the model has no transitional dynamics
and the economy moves directly to the balanced growth path, whatever the initial conditions.
This feature of the model is mainly due to the fact that there are no stock variables present in
the economy. At any point in time, all the output is used for either consumption or investment
towards the RDI sector and no stocks are build up. Furthermore, pollution is specified as a flow
variable, thus no pollution is transfered from one period to the next and arises every period anew.
3.4.2 Comparative Statics
Scale Effects In accordance with equations (14) and (32), the prevailing growth rate γ of the
economy increases with the size of the population L. This seems realistic in this context, since
a bigger workforce makes it possible to produce more final good output, which in turn boosts
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innovations, the mainspring of economic growth in this setting, due to more disposable research
investment. In reality though, this sort of scale effect can hardly be observed (Jones, 1999), and
hence scale effects would have to be eliminated, for example by modifying the research technology
or by allowing for horizontal and vertical innovations.8 But, to simplify matters, in this model
scale effects are accepted.
Changes in η The parameter η determines the degree of pollution aversion of the households
and since
ucP = η (1− θ)C−θP η(1−θ)−1, (49)
also the magnitude of the “distaste” effect. While it is obvious from equation (49) that an increase
(decrease) of η leads to an easing (strengthening) of the “distaste” effect,9 the effect of a change
in η on the growth rate is somewhat less straightforward. Deriving equation (32) with respect to
η yields
∂γ
∂η
=
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)2
(1− θ) (1− ζ)(
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
)2 . (50)
Expectedly, equation (50) does not just depend on the η, but also on the specification of ζ.
Consequently, the analysis of changes in η once more has to distinguish between five different
specifications of ζ.
Scenario 1 (ζ < 0): An increase in η leads to more growth.
Scenario 2 (ζ = 0): An increase in η leads to more growth.
Scenario 3 (0 < ζ < 1): An increase in η leads to more growth.
Scenario 4 (ζ = 1): An increase in η has no effect on growth.
Scenario 5 (ζ > 1): An increase in η leads to less growth.
The reasoning behind these results is similar to the argumentation in section 3.3 regarding
the effect of pollution on the growth rate and is therefore not repeated at this point. The sole
difference here is that an increase (decrease) in η weakens (strengthens) the “distaste” effect and
thus the pollution effect is less (more) severe.
8At this point, the interested reader is kindly referred to the work of Aghion and Howitt (1998) and
(2009), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) or Young (1998).
9Keep in mind, that in section 2.2, η has been defined to be smaller than zero. Consequently, as η
increases (η moves towards zero) the distaste of the households for pollution decreases and a reduction of
η (η moves towards −∞) induces a rise in the antipathy to pollution.
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Changes in ζ The value ζ determines what effect the level of technological progress has on
pollution and is crucial regarding the extent as well as the evolution of pollution in the economy.
Under the terms of equations (8) and (24), an increase in ζ leads to a reduction of the amount
of pollution present in the economy and over time to slower pollution growth or, if ζ > 1, to
a faster decrease of pollution. Following the argumentation in section 3.3, less pollution allows
more consumption and, by the means of increased research incentives, in the end induces higher
economic growth.
One arrives at the same conclusion when analyzing the derivative of the economic growth rate
in equation (32) with respect to ζ,
∂γ
∂ζ
= −
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)2
η (1− θ)(
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
)2 > 0. (51)
Since it has been assumed that (p¯iA− ρ) > 0 and η(1 − θ) < 0 the term on the right hand side
of equation (51) is always positive and therefore confirms the argument that a rise in ζ results in
higher economic growth.
Changes in θ In this economy, θ represents the multiplicative inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. A change in θ has two implications, it changes the households’ pref-
erences towards consumption and in this setting additionally their attitude regarding pollution.
Accordingly, the effect of a change in θ on the growth rate consists of two distinct effects.
∂γ
∂θ
=−
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)2
(
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption effect
−
η (1− ζ) (p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)2
(
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pollution effect
(52)
The implications of the consumption effect (ce) on the growth rate is straightforward. If θ
rises, households care more about consumption today and are less willing to delay consumption in
favor of higher research investment. Therewith the households cripple the mainspring of economic
growth and consequently growth falls. Correspondingly,
ce = −
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)2
(
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
)2 < 0. (53)
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The magnitude and the direction of the pollution effect (pe) is less obvious. Since ucP =
η (1− θ) c−θP η(1−θ)−1, an increase in θ weakens the “distaste effect” and as described in section
3.3 this can have positive or negative implications on the economic growth rate, depending on the
assumptions regarding the effect of technological progress on pollution. Hereof it becomes clear
why the pollution effect features the term (1 − ζ). Whenever ζ > 1 the easing of the “distaste
effect”, due to a raise of θ, entails a decrease of consumption and, in the long run, leads to less
growth. The pollution effect is consequently negative. If ζ ≤ 1 the effect is reversed and the
pollution effect is positive. To summarize
pe = −
η (1− ζ) (p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)2
(
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ))
)2
{
< 0 if ζ > 1
≥ 0 if ζ ≤ 1.
(54)
Therefore, while the consumption and output effect may go in the same direction, they may
also oppose each other and the overall effect of a change in θ once more crucially depends on the
parameter constellation of η and (1−ζ). From equation (52) it becomes clear that if η(1−ζ) ≥ −1,
then the overall effect is positive and the growth rate increases when θ rises. On the other hand,
if η(1− ζ) < −1 the overall effect is negative.
Changes in A and B A and B both represent productivity parameters and, by definition,
an increase in productivity always leads to an augmented output in the corresponding sector.
Thus a rise in B increases the quantity of the final good in the economy, thereby allows more
research investment and finally leads to higher growth. A rise in A on the other hand increases
the probability of a successful innovation and therewith directly boosts the rate of technological
progress, which in turn equals the economic growth rate according to equation (23).
4 Pareto Optimality
All in all, there are four possible sources of inefficiency throughout the model: monopolistic
pricing in the intermediate good sector, the appropriability effect, the business stealing effect and
finally pollution externalities.
4.1 Monopolistic Pricing
A first reason for suboptimality is monopolistic pricing. Owing to the fact that in this model
innovations are always drastic and protected through patents, innovating firms in the intermediate
good sector enjoy monopole power. This enables them to ask for higher prices compared to prices
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in a fully competitive environment. Therewith monopolistic pricing reduces the quantities of
traded intermediate goods and induces a dead weight loss. What is more, a reduced quantity of
intermediate goods implies less final output and in the end leads to inefficiently low economic
growth as a result of less available goods for research investment.
4.2 Appropriability Effect
A second source of inefficiency results from insufficient property rights (Arrow, 1962) and is
commonly referred to as the appropriability effect or the problem of appropriability (Acemoglu,
2009). The appropriability effect arises because innovators are not able to capture the entire
social gain created by an innovation and as a consequence the private value of an innovation
falls short of its social value. This problematic is based on the fact that an innovation does not
only enable the innovator to capture temporary private profits but, as it is non-excludable, it
also advances the public knowledge of a good so that future research can directly develop the
next generation of the product. Consequently, research firms do not devote as much resources
towards innovations as would be socially optimal and the appropriability effect abates growth in
the decentralized economy.
4.3 Business Stealing Effect
A third cause of suboptimailty is the business stealing effect, which occurs as a result of different
research incentives of incumbents and newcomers. In this economy innovations are assumed to be
drastic and due to Arrow’s replacement effect technological breakthroughs are always carried out
by entrants (Arrow, 1962). The research incentives of a newcomer equal the profits he will make
if he successfully innovates, since by means of a successful innovation an entrant replaces the
incumbent as the sole producer of the enhanced good and can “steal” his monopolist rents. The
social planner, on the other hand, values an innovation according to the profits of the incumbent
monopolist as he can account for them as part of the producers’ surplus. From applying once more
Arrow’s replacement effect it becomes clear that the research incentives of the social planner are
lower than those of an entrant and hence lower than those in a laissez-faire setting. Accordingly,
in the decentralized economy, the business stealing effect inflates research investment and in the
end causes excessive growth.
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4.4 Pollution Externalities
The fourth and last distortion in this economy is linked to the creation of pollution in the in-
termediate sector and it emerges because households and firms do not anticipate all the effects
pollution has on the economy. As the computation of the social planner’s choice with respect to
pollution is rather complex, it is convenient to analyze the effect of an increase or a decrease of
pollution on utility instead, in order to understand how the social planner would choose pollution.
In the equilibrium, pollution has two opposing effects on welfare. On the one hand, it is
straightforward to see from uP that pollution directly decreases the households’ utility and in
compliance with the pollution elasticity of utility, one unit less pollution increases the utility by∣∣∣∣ ∂u∂P Pu
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣η (1− θ) (cP η)(1−θ)(cP η)(1−θ) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ , (55)
which can be simplified to ∣∣∣∣ ∂u∂P Pu
∣∣∣∣ = |η (1− θ)| (56)
when assuming that the productivity of the final sector B is sufficiently large, that approximately
(cP η)(1−θ) ≈ (cP η)(1−θ) − 1.
On the other hand, as pollution is an imperative byproduct of the production of intermediates,
a decrease in pollution is equivalent to a restriction of the intermediate production. A reduced
intermediate production in turn entails a reduction in final output, due to the lack of inputs, and
leads to a drop in research investment, intermediate investment and consumption. The decrease
in consumption, as a result of less available final output and due to less economic growth because
of the decrease in research investment, and the subsequent diminution of utility can then be seen
as the indirect pollution effect on utility. To quantify the indirect pollution effect, it has to be
determined by how much consumption decreases when pollution diminishes and additionally by
how much utility changes when more or less consumption is available. The former is given by the
pollution elasticity of consumption
∂C
∂P
P
C
=
1
1− ζ , (57)
which becomes clear when recalling equation (21) and (22). The latter by the consumption
elasticity of utility
∂u
∂C
C
u
= (1− θ) (cP
η)(1−θ)
(cP η)(1−θ) − 1
, (58)
which can also be simplified to
∂u
∂C
C
u
= (1− θ) (59)
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when using the same assumption on B as above.
Combined, the indirect pollution effect is consequently(
∂C
∂P
P
C
)(
∂u
∂C
C
u
)
=
1
1− ζ (1− θ) , (60)
and a one unit decrease of pollution leads to a 11−ζ (1− θ) decrease of utility as a result of the
indirect pollution effect.
The overall effect of a change in pollution on welfare is thus a combination of the direct and
indirect pollution effect on welfare,
overall effect = (1− θ)
(
η +
1
1− ζ
)
. (61)
Depending on the specifications of ζ, the two effects may oppose each other. The overall effect is
positive if η > − 11−ζ and negative if η < − 11−ζ . Therefore, if η > − 11−ζ , the social planner would
choose a higher level of pollution than the level prevailing in the decentralized economy and if
η < − 11−ζ , the planner would prefer a lower amount of pollution. This makes clear that apart
from a setting in which η = − 11−ζ , the laissez-faire economy will exhibit a suboptimal amount of
pollution and therewith an inefficient growth rate.
4.5 Overall Effect of the Distortions and Implementation of the
Optimum
To summarize, seen on their own, monopolistic pricing and the appropriability effect imply a
suboptimal low growth rate, the business stealing effect inflates the growth rate to an inefficient
level and the pollution externalities expand or diminish the prevailing growth rate to a suboptimal
amount, depending on the specification of ζ with respect to η. The overall implications of the four
distortions remain opaque and, as in most Schumpeterian growth models, the prevailing growth
rate in the laissez-faire equilibrium is Pareto suboptimal.
The socially optimal path can be implemented through the introduction of three policy tools:
a subsidy to the final good sector, a subsidy towards the research sector and tradable pollution
permits.
As in standard endogenous growth models, adequate subsidies to the firms in the final good
sector as well as to research firms, financed by a lump sum tax on household income, allow to
mitigate the distortions that are generated through the presence of monopolistic pricing and
incorrect research incentives. Such subsidies take effect by appropriately adjusting the price of
the intermediate goods and by installing adequate research incentives (i.a. Acemoglu, 2009).
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The pollution permits in turn, which could also be replaced by a suitable pollution tax (Gri-
maud, 1998 and 1999),10 enable the policy makers to control the amount of pollution present in
the economy and can thereby counter the pollution externalities. The functioning of the pollution
permits is straight forward. For every unit of pollution that firms in the intermediate sector emit,
they need a pollution permit which they can either obtain to a certain amount for free from
the government (grandfathering) or buy on a competitive market. This alters the production
and innovation decision of the firms in question by introducing a new necessary input into the
production function for the intermediate good. Their modified profit function is thus
piRDI permit(κj) = pjXj −Xj − pa (Pj − Sj) , (62)
where pa is the price of a pollution permit and Sj the quantity of allowance a firm receives from
the government for free. Clearly a tight (generous) regime regarding the distribution of pollution
licenses increases (reduces) the costs for the intermediate firms and in the end reduces (increases)
pollution. Accordingly, by choosing an appropriate distribution scheme policy makers can install
the desired amount of pollution.
5 Discussion
5.1 Pollution Threshold
The next section seeks to resolve one of the main questions in the debate on environment and
growth, namely whether economic growth is sustainable if the agents can only cope with a certain
amount of pollution. Whereas in this context, sustainability is associated with the ability to
support the growth rate prevailing in the equilibrium ad infinitum.
To resolve this question the underlying model is enlarged, so that not only the households
are affected from pollution but also the research sector. It is assumed that if pollution exceeds a
certain level, it interferes with the innovating process and in the end disrupts all research effort.
Hence, there exists a pollution threshold above which the productivity parameter of the research
sector A drops to zero. To justify this assumption, imagine for instance that the research sector
uses highly sensitive instruments which become inaccurate in the presence of too much pollution
in form of electric smog.
Additionally, the following analysis will also presume that the research firms do not antici-
pate the inefficiency of their undertaking when the pollution threshold is reached, so that their
10Note, Grimaud (1998, 1999) bases his analysis on models which allow for endogenous pollution inten-
sities, but which do not link the pollution intensity to the level of overall technological progress in contrast
to the model presented here. However, in this context this feature does not change Grimaud’s reasoning.
24
innovation decision will not change and their demand for the intermediate good will not cease.
However, note that this assumption is only for the sake of comprehensibility, the implications of
a pollution threshold would remain the same if the research firms would be allowed to alter their
innovation decision, solely the propagation mechanism would be less intuitive.
Before analyzing all the implications of a pollution threshold on the economy as a whole, it
is reasonable to determine when, if at all, such a boundary is reached.
From equation (24) it is clear that pollution grows at the rate (1− ζ)γ in equilibrium. Obvi-
ously, if ζ ≤ 1, pollution will be constant or fall in equilibrium and the pollution threshold will
be reached at no point in time as long as the pollution threshold is higher than the first pollution
level. Consequently, in this case the level of pollution never interferes with the research effort
and growth is truly sustainable.
If ζ < 1, the amount of pollution emitted by the intermediate sector will inevitably reach its
critical value at some point in time, whereas the exact moment depends on the specifications of
the pollution threshold. Generally one could think of a multitude of different specification of the
pollution threshold and while the pollution threshold could depend on the level of technological
progress it might also be constant over time. Here, the moment where pollution attains its
threshold will be computed exemplary for these two different specifications.
First, suppose that the pollution threshold is constant and equals P¯ . From the pollution
production function (8) it is clear that P¯ involves an intermediate production of
X¯ = P¯Qζ . (63)
This can be combined with the total demand for intermediates from equation (10) and finally
leads to the level of technological progress at which pollution has serious consequences for the
research sector,
Q¯P¯ =
(
P¯
α
2
1−αLB
1
1−α
) 1
1−ζ
. (64)
On the other hand, assume that the pollution threshold is an increasing function of the level
of technological progress. For example
P¯ (Q) = P¯0mQ, (65)
with m and P¯0 being both positive. Analog to the derivation above, this results in
Q¯P¯ (Q) =
(
P¯0m
α
2
1−αLB
1
1−α
) 1
−ζ
, (66)
as the level of technological progress at which the pollution threshold is reached.
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Note that a part of determining the moment of a problematic pollution level, equation (64)
and (66) once more stress the importance of the parameter ζ, as for higher (lower) ζ the economy
can grow for a longer (shorter) period before the innovation process is affected from pollution.
But, as long as ζ < 1 at some point in time, which from now on is denoted as tP¯ , pollution will
attain its critical level and this will have severe implications for the economy.
Once the emissions from the intermediate good sector reach the pollution threshold at time tP¯ ,
by assumption the productivity parameter of the research sector drops to zero. This implies that
the firms in the RDI sector are no longer able to innovate and consequently the aggregated quality
index is not advanced, so Q(tP¯ ) = Q(t
′) for all t′ > tP¯ . Given that the level of technological
progress Q has not changed from tP¯ to t
′, all the endogenous variables within the model, in
particular the demand for the intermediates X, remain unchanged and the economy is frozen
at its state in tP¯ . This involves that the level of pollution P also remains unchanged compared
to tP¯ , and hence in t
′ the pollution threshold is reached once again. Therefore, from tP¯ on, no
changes occur in the model and once the pollution threshold is reached in tP¯ , the economy stalls
at its current level. Thus in this setting growth is only sustainable if ζ ≥ 1, else the permanent
pollution growth will eventually halt growth in the economy.
5.2 Pollution Abatement
Another important question in the discussion on environment and growth is whether mitigation
efforts have an effect on economic growth rates. But, up to now, the underlying model has
abstracted from the idea that pollution may be depleted. For this reason, the following section
will overcome this simplification and will explore how waste disposal affects the economic growth
rate in an environmental growth model.
Essentially, there are two approaches in the economic literature of how pollution abatement
can be modeled in an environmental growth model. The first is to introduce a government into
the model, which finances abatement spending. See Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994) for an
example. The other consists of allowing private firms to undertake abatement activities and
has been elaborated for instance by Bovenberg and Smulders (1995). But given that the model
presented in this work does not incorporate a government and the fact that the firms in the
intermediate sector have hardly any incentive to spend resources on waste disposal, this model
will use a new approach and will assume that the households can engage in mitigation activities.
Thus henceforth, the households can devote resources towards waste disposal and can thereby
reduce the quantity of pollution they are effectively exposed to. Following the work of Greiner
26
and Semmler (2008) effective pollution is
PE(t) =
P (t)
D(t)β
, (67)
with D(t) being the total amount of final good that is used for pollution abatement and 0 < β < 1.
In addition it is assumed that D(t)β > 1 to ensure that effective pollution is always smaller than
pollution without abatement. Correspondingly, the momentary utility of the households is now
u(t) =
 11−θ
(
(c(t)PE(t)
η)(1−θ) − 1
)
for 0 < θ <∞ and θ 6= 1
ln c(t) + η lnPE(t) for θ = 1.
(68)
The possibility of waste disposal alters the household problem and in this context the house-
holds seek to maximize their overall utility by choosing an optimal amount of consumption and
abatement in consideration of the usual constraints. Thus their optimization problem is given by
max
c(t),d(t)
U(0) =
∫∞
0 e
−ρt 1
1−θ
(
(c(t)PE(t)
η)(1−θ) − 1
)
dt
s.t. a˙(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t)− c(t)− d(t)
PE(t) =
P (t)
D(t)β
a(0) = a0
lim
t→∞
(
a(t)e−r(t)
) ≥ 0,
(69)
where d(t) is the amount of abatement spending, each household contributes to D(t). Note,
although each household can only contribute to the economy-wide abatement effort with its
own share d(t), they nevertheless benefit from the amount of total waste disposal. This seems
reasonable when thinking of a public park in which the people are urged to take care of their own
litter in order to keep the park nice and clean for everybody.
Solving the optimization problem yields the optimal private and total abatement expenditures
d = −ηβc (70)
D = −ηβC (71)
as well as
r = ρ+ θ
C˙
C
− η (1− θ) P˙
P
+ (ηβ (1− θ)) D˙
D
(72)
as a new extended Ramsey Rule.11 Interestingly, equations (70) and (71) identify pollution abate-
ment as some form of consumption and apparently when the households are given the possibility
11The complete derivation of the solution of the extended household problem can be seen in section A.2
in the appendix.
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to invest in waste disposal there is a direct trade-off between consumption and abatement spend-
ing. This also implies that d˙d =
c˙
c =
D˙
D =
C˙
C , which will be useful when computing the growth
rate of the economy.
Furthermore, since waste disposal can be done exclusively by the households and none of the
other sectors is affected directly by pollution, the introduction of pollution abatement has no
effect on the production and innovation decisions of the final good sector and the RDI sector.
Correspondingly equations (23), (24) and (28) are also satisfied in this enlarged setting, whereas
equation (23) can even be expanded by the term D˙D because
D˙
D =
C˙
C . Hence, analog to section
3.1, the new extended Ramsey Rule (72) can be combined with the growth rate of the aggregated
quality index (28) and the growth rate of pollution (24) in order to determine the prevailing
growth rate of the economy. At first this leads to
rabatement =
ρ+ p¯iA
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ − β))
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ − β))
(73)
and then to
γabatement =
(p¯iA− ρ)
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
1 +
(
q
α
(1−α) − 1
)
(θ − η (1− θ) (1− ζ − β))
. (74)
According to this, the growth rate of the economy with pollution abatement is bigger than
the growth rate in an economy that does not allow waste disposal and thus mitigation efforts
have a positive effect on the economy. The reason for this is that when the households can
deplete pollution, they can cope better with the pollution created in the RDI sector and are less
negatively affected directly by pollution. Consequently, the households can bear a higher level of
pollution which involves an increased demand of final goods and in the end enables the firms to
undertake more research.
6 Conclusion
This work investigates the effect of pollution on economic growth using a Schumpeterian growth
model which has been enlarged to include an environmental dimension. The model explicitly
links the pollution intensity of economic activity to the overall level of technological progress in
order to explore the role of pollution intensities in combination with technological progress on
the growth environment-puzzle. Various questions regarding the balanced growth path of the
economy, the social optimum, a pollution threshold and pollution abatement are studied and in
the end several conclusions emerge from the analysis of the model.
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In equilibrium, the economy follows a balanced growth path where output, research invest-
ment, consumption, as well as the level of technological progress grow at a constant, positive rate.
Predictably the effect of pollution on the economic growth rate is not trivial. It vitally depends on
the households’ degree of pollution aversion and even more on the link between pollution intensity
and the technology level. All in all, pollution dampens the economic growth rate if a rise in the
level of technological progress does not imply a big enough decrease of the pollution intensity,
more precisely for ζ < 1, and fosters growth if the pollution intensity falls disproportionately fast
when the economy advances (ζ ≥ 1). Pollution growth is proportional to the growth rate of the
economy and also crucially depends on how the pollution intensity of the production process is
linked to the level of technological progress. If the pollution intensity declines fast enough when
the level of technological progress increases over time, this is the case for ζ > 1, pollution declines
over time, else pollution grows or is constant.
Due to four types of deviations, namely monopolistic pricing, the appropriability effect, the
business stealing effect and pollution externalities, the decentralized solution does not meet the
social optimum. But, the social optimum can be implemented through the introduction of a
subsidy to the final good sector, a subsidy towards the research sector and tradable pollution
permits.
Given a pollution threshold above which no research is possible, sustained economic growth
is only feasible if pollution does not increase over time. This implies that ζ has to be above unity.
Otherwise, at some point in time pollution will halt growth in the economy.
The possibility of pollution abatement enables the households to cope better with the pollution
emitted during the production process and allows the economy to grow at a higher rate.
There remain various interesting extensions that could be incorporated into the model and many
unresolved questions for further research. An interesting modification would be to introduce pol-
lution as a stock variable instead of assuming that pollution can not be transfered from one period
to the next. This would allow to study transitional dynamics and to account for regenerative
processes. It would also be intriguing to extend the effect of pollution on the agents present in the
economy. The labor supply could be vulnerable to pollution or environmental degradation might
influence the production technology. Finally, up to now the analysis completely neglects uncer-
tainty. However, the implications of uncertainty about future consequences of present actions are
of vital interest, in particular in the context of environmental problems. Naturally, this list is
far from exhaustive and the growth-environment puzzle certainly bears enough open questions to
continue to be subject to further economic research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Household Problem
The households strive to maximize their overall utility in consideration of their initial assets and
their income, while taking the amount of pollution in the economy as exogenously given and
obeying the No Ponzi Game condition. Thus the households’ optimization problem is
max
c(t)
U(0) =
∫∞
0 e
−ρt 1
1−θ
(
(c(t)P (t)η)(1−θ) − 1
)
dt
s.t. a˙(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t)− c(t)
a(0) = a0
lim
t→∞
(
a(t)e−r(t)
) ≥ 0,
(A.1)
where 0 < ρ < ∞ represents the rate of time preference, a(t) the assets owned by a household,
r(t) the interest rate and w(t) the wage, all three at time t. The present value Hamiltonian is
accordingly
H (t, a(t), c(t), µ(t)) = e−ρt
1
1− θ
(
(c(t)P (t)η)(1−θ) − 1
)
+ µ(t) (r(t)a(t) + w(t)− c(t)) ,
(A.2)
with µ(t) being the Hamiltonian multiplier. The first order conditions are
∂H
∂c
= e−ρtP η(1−θ)c−θ − µ = 0 (A.3)
∂H
∂a
= µr = −µ˙ (A.4)
and the transversality condition is given by
lim
t→∞ (µ(t)a(t)) = 0. (A.5)
Finally, linerazing equation (A.3), deriving it with respect to time and combining the derivative
with equation (A.4) yields equation (9).
A.2 Household Problem with Pollution Abatement
When allowing for pollution abatement, the households strive to maximize their overall utility
by choosing an optimal amount of consumption and abatement spending, in consideration of
their initial assets and their income, while taking the amount of pollution in the economy as
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exogenously given and obeying the No Ponzi Game condition. Thus the households’ optimization
problem is
max
c(t),d(t)
U(0) =
∫∞
0 e
−ρt 1
1−θ
(
(c(t)PE(t)
η)(1−θ) − 1
)
dt
s.t. a˙(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t)− c(t)− d(t)
PE(t) =
P (t)
D(t)β
a(0) = a0
lim
t→∞
(
a(t)e−r(t)
) ≥ 0.
(A.6)
When exploiting the fact that all households are identical and will therefore choose the same
quantity of abatement, so d(t) = D(t)L , the present value Hamiltonian is given by
H (t, a(t), c(t), d(t), µ(t))
= e−ρt
1
1− θ
c(t)1−θ( P (t)
(d(t)L)β
)η(1−θ)
− 1

+ µ(t) (r(t)a(t) + w(t)− c(t)− d(t)) ,
(A.7)
with the Hamiltonian multiplier µ(t). The first order conditions are
∂H
∂c
= e−ρtP η(1−θ) (dL)−ηβ(1−θ) c−θ − µ = 0 (A.8)
∂H
∂d
= (−ηβ) e−ρtc1−θP η(1−θ)d−ηβ(1−θ)−1L−ηβ(1−θ) − µ = 0 (A.9)
∂H
∂a
= µr = −µ˙ (A.10)
and the transversality condition is given by
lim
t→∞ (µ(t)a(t)) = 0. (A.11)
Combining the first order conditions (A.8) and (A.9) enables to solve the optimal private and
total abatement spending:
d = −ηβc, (A.12)
D = −ηβC. (A.13)
Finally, linerazing equation (A.8), deriving it with respect to time and combining the derivative
with equation (A.10) yields equation (72).
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